The Fair Factories Clearinghouse: Sourcing Ethics Improved Through Information Systems by Gallaugher, John
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
AMCIS 2010 Proceedings Americas Conference on Information Systems(AMCIS)
8-2010
The Fair Factories Clearinghouse: Sourcing Ethics
Improved Through Information Systems
John Gallaugher
Boston College, john.gallaugher@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2010
This material is brought to you by the Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in AMCIS 2010 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Gallaugher, John, "The Fair Factories Clearinghouse: Sourcing Ethics Improved Through Information Systems" (2010). AMCIS 2010
Proceedings. 98.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2010/98
Gallaugher and Liu  Fair Factories Clearninghouse 
Proceedings of the Sixteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Lima, Peru,  August 12-15, 2010. 1 
The Fair Factories Clearinghouse: Sourcing Ethics 









Firms that outsource production to supply partners are at risk if those suppliers engage in unethical behavior.  Such issues 
have been particularly acute in the apparel industry.  If suppliers engage in unethical practices, firms may suffer brand and 
reputation damage, lost sales, cancelled contracts, legal penalties, lower employee morale, and more.  An innovative 
program, originated at Reebok and expanded to become an interorganizational non-profit, the Fair Factories Clearinghouse, 
leverages technology to improve industry standards, lower costs, and reduce risks.  The Fair Factories Clearinghouse offers 
an information systems-based solution that allows members to record, capture, and share audit information.  This case study 
discuses the genesis of the FFC, the functionality and benefits of the system, and highlights an area where globally-focused 
technology can be used for deep and lasting social impact. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“I didn’t want to come here, but we’re very poor and I had to come” – Sun Thyda, Age 12 
The above quote from a Cambodian factory worker, a girl not yet a teenager, was captured on film in the BBC documentary 
“Gap and Nike: No Sweat?” (Kenyon, 2000).  Thyda and six other girls interviewed reported working conditions that 
included shift cycles of up to 16 hours, seven-days a week.  The factory Thyda labored at was a contract manufacturer, which 
produced products for the American apparel giant Nike, and the firm’s products were prominently featured throughout the 
film.  In the eyes of many, the brand was the film’s villain. 
This was not the first incident for Nike.  Throughout the 1990s the firm had been repeatedly marred by accusations that many 
of its contract manufacturers produced Nike products in sweatshop conditions.  And the damage that can ensue from 
unethical manufacturing practices can have lasting implications for organizations. Protesters crafted logos featuring the word 
“Slavery”, with the letter ‘v’ replaced by a Nike swoosh.  Others ridiculed the firm with the tag line “Just Don’t Do It”. Nike 
was initially reluctant to deal with protestor confrontation.  For example, in 1999, student activists demanded that Nike 
release a list of factories it was employing, but the company claimed such data was proprietary, eventually relenting in 2004 
when pressure simply became too great.  To this day, the Nike brand carries tarnish from the events of the 1990s, a period 
that also saw market share fall and the value of the firm plummet by 50 percent (Carty and Tamara, 2001).  And Nike is not 
alone, Wal-mart, Gap, and other leading manufacturers have repeatedly been the focus of exposés highlighting ghastly 
incidents and horrendous labor conditions in supplier factories.  In addition to the negative impact on exploited workers or 
harmful environmental effects, these incidents damage brands, can lead to lower sales, cancelled contracts, lower worker 
morale, fines, and other financial damage (e.g. Garrett et al., 1998; Spar and La Mure, 2003). 
Damage and outrage was so widespread that the apparel industry was forced into taking an active role in setting standards.  
Several firms formed the Fair Labor Association to promote the auditing, monitoring, and enforcement of working condition 
standards. By 2002, over 21 NGOs, 170 colleges, 982 university licensee companies, and several firms had signed on to the 
FLA's Code of Conduct (Spar and La Mure, 2003).  While well-intentioned standards and codes of conduct are an important 
step in the right direction, success lies in enforcement across industries.  If information on unethical behavior is not exposed 
and shared, industry-wide, then unethical contract manufacturers can often simply move on to the next unsuspecting 
contractor.  Vulnerabilities continue, problem not solved.  Issues are further heightened when social media and lightning-fast 
community organization can galvanize outrage and scar reputations on the permanent record that is the Internet (Kane et al., 
2009). 
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But while technology amplifies damning messages, technology can also help firms take an active role in screening out 
unethical contract manufacturers. While it has been shown that interorganizational information systems can help firms share 
data to improve industry-wide practices (Kumar et al, 1998; Welty and Becerra-Fernandez, 2001; Zhu et al., 2006), there has 
been scant research on the impact of technology to improve industry-wide ethics and corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
This case study highlights how an internally developed system at one apparel manufacturer formed the nucleus of an inter-
industry data collection and sharing system, meant to improve contract-manufacturing practices worldwide.  The paper 
underscores issues and challenges in developing such a system.  And it importantly highlights the positive role information 
technology can play in improving corporate social responsibility. 
PROBLEM 
As globalization spreads and supply chains continue to stretch into more and more countries, there is increasing concern 
among human rights activists, politicians, and corporations that workers in factories around the world are being exploited. 
Scott Greathead, chief executive of human rights consulting firm World Monitors Inc and Partner in the law firm Wiggin & 
Dana, notes a shift in the 1990s from activists targeting governments to activists targeting multinational corporations 
(Scheffey, 2006).  
Reports of exploitation have pushed firms to reassess controls in their supply chain. The apparel industry was one of the first 
to make this shift because it was one of the earliest and most frequent users of outsourcing. Competition in the industry 
places a heavy emphasis on brand (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005). As Nike discovered, once a brand has been tarnished, 
it could take years to rebuild its reputation. 
The primary way companies keep tabs on their suppliers is through social audits.  Audits have increased as industry 
associations have begun to promote compliance and as firms realize that to skip accepted compliance practices risks unethical 
partner behavior, consumer criticism, and further damage (Pereira, 2005).  
However, while important, audits alone are not the answer (Kolka and van Tulderb, 2002). Most notably, audit information 
had rarely been shared among suppliers, making it difficult to uncover and eliminate an unethical operator.  Audit standards 
are also criticized as being poorly defined and difficult to enforce. In a 2008 report on sustainability by the Business 
Intelligence Unit of The Economist, executives admitted that the supply chain is often “the weakest link” in maintaining 
effective corporate social responsibility (CSR), however 1/5 of the 1200 executives surveyed said they “performed poorly” in 
setting stronger supplier standards on both environmental and human rights issues. The same proportion had only instituted 
supplier controls in last five years (Economist Business Intelligence Unit, 2008).  
Compliance doesn’t come cheap and executives have also voiced their concern over audit expense.  CEOs attending a 
November 2002 conference in New York complained of having to ‘carry the burden’ of factory monitoring while some of 
their rivals did nothing. Audit costs often range from $1,200 to $1,500 and major manufacturers with diverse product lines 
might use 500 to as many as 3,000 factories per year (Pereira, 2005).  This has left many firms who sought to outsource as a 
way to lower costs, now forced to spend more in overhead to ensure suppliers are behaving acceptably. 
REEBOK & THE ORIGINS OF THE FFC 
With hundreds of contract suppliers operating across product lines, the problem was particularly acute for Reebok.  It is noted 
that firm had avoided many of the mistakes of Nike.  In fact, Reebok had long made corporate social responsibility a major 
firm initiative – the firm even has a Vice President for Human Rights.  However, Reebok also realized its vulnerabilities.  
With hundreds of contract manufacturers serving different divisions of the firm (e.g. footwear, apparel, sporting equipment) 
that had not previously communicated to one another, it was possible for one division to cancel a contract with an unethical 
supplier, only to have that supplier shop its services to another Reebok division, with this new division unaware the firm had 
already deemed the supplier unacceptable. Reebok’s audits were saved as Word documents on individual computers, with no 
formal method of searching, sharing, and comparing the firm’s gathered intelligence on suppliers.  Under this system, 
progress was hard to monitor and red flags were hard to spot.  
Reebok CIO Peter Burrows knew that technology could help improve the process while lowering costs.  The solution was to 
create a structured but flexible web-based database program for collecting and sharing audit information. Reebok invested $1 
million dollars to develop its own internal software, the Human Rights Tracking System (HRTS), to track conditions at 
factories where its apparel was being produced (Kirsner, 2005; Power, 2005).  The Human Rights Tracking System fulfills 
several functions (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005):  
• It gives the company’s own purchasers, who must consult the database before sourcing an order, instant, real-
time data on whether a factory’s practices are acceptable, thus saving time, costs and site visits. 
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• It helps the company assist intermediary sources to manage their supply chains. 
• It has increased consistency across human rights audit reports. 
• It allows some automated data collection, although social audits remain largely manual.  
• It permits easy comparison of factories over time and highlights any large geographic areas of non-compliance 
where auditors should focus. 
• It is flexible enough to monitor compliance with environmental rules and U.S. regulations that deal with 
security at foreign factories producing goods for American markets. 
 
After three years of internal use, the HRTS was so successful other companies began to take notice and asked Reebok about 
buying the software. This prompted Reebok’s Burrows, and VP of Human Rights Doug Cahn, to sense an opportunity. The 
issue Reebok faced with divisions that hadn’t shared data was amplified throughout the industry. Companies in the apparel 
industry share many of the same factories, but if buyers don’t share information on bad apples, other buyers can’t take action 
to quash bad behavior. No single buyer could effectively control factory conditions by acting unilaterally. But sharing audit 
information allows companies to use joint leverage over factories to improve conditions.  This also offers the added financial 
incentive of less money lost in redundant audits or re-screening firms that should have been eliminated before a site visit. By 
opening Reebok’s software up to other buyers, Reebok could create a network effect that improved the value of technology 
(Shapiro and Varian, 1999).  A shared system would enable more buyers with data on more suppliers to create a system that 
adds more value – both raising the bar of ethical practice while potentially allowing firms to lower costs through more 
coordinated audit practices. 
Realizing the potential, Burrows and Cahn, decided to share their technology with the rest of the industry.  Gaining 
participants is critical to jumpstarting any system where network effects exists (Gallaugher and Wang, 2002; Eisenmann et 
al., 2006), and an effort coming solely from Reebok risked being seen as a “competitor’s system”.  In order to seed the 
network with buyers and suppliers and provide additional buyer-neutral legitimacy to the effort, Reebok International Ltd., 
together with the National Retail Federation, Retail Council of Canada and the organization World Monitors jointly formed 
the Fair Factories Clearinghouse (FFC), a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization in late 2004. 
When the FFC was first launched, it made clear what it was not meant to do. It would not be a standard or ranking; FFC is 
neutral to codes (Economist Business Intelligence Unit, 2008). It merely allows companies to compare different codes and 
encourages them to work out solutions on their own. It is also not a blacklist for factories with human rights violations 
(Pereira, 2008). Its goal is to increase transparency and encourage best practices.  The firm articulates its mission across four 
key principles: 
• Technology enables cost-effective, well-informed ethical business transactions and continuous improvements in global 
workplaces 
• Enhancing the capacity of business to conduct ethical sourcing 
• Experienced partners share capability and enhance effectiveness 
• Global clearinghouse contributes to factory improvements 
 
 In the words of the firm’s website, the FFC was established to use technology to: 
• Lower the cost of entry for those seeking to manage compliance programs 
• Improve the availability, comprehensiveness, and standardization of compliance standards and audits through the use of 
a global management system to track workplace conditions 
• Facilitate the exchange of non-competitive information concerning factory compliance, and enable collaboration in 
global efforts to assess and improve workplace conditions 
• Reduce audit fatigue through the sharing of compliance data, without mandating any specific standard or rating factories 
• Advance and promote education & knowledge about global workplace conditions 
 
Reebok donated the HTRS software, which became the basis for the Audit Management System, to the FFC through a 
perpetual license. The FFC’s website went live January 18, 2005 and received a $350,000 grant from State Department’s 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to provide seed capital and help launch the effort (Power, 2005). Today, the 
FFC software includes over 23,000 factories, 5,000 intermediaries, and 3,000 users in over 120 countries.  Over 90% of the 
factories have compliance documents, in the form of either audits or self-assessments. These documents report everything 
from child and forced labor to health and safety standard at the factory to workers’ wages and freedom association. 
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Today FFC has grown to include many well known brands such as Burberry, Nike, L.L. Bean, Starbucks, and in 2009, the 
retail giant Wal-mart. The FFC is not limited to big name brands either. Small and medium sized firms may not have 
resources to build their own million-dollar database system to manage audits, but the FFC gives them another option. For an 
annual subscription fee, these firms can gain the same access to audits and other information as the big firms.  This is 
important – the cloud-based FFC solution effectively lowers the bar of CSR initiatives and allows new entrants to leverage 
and contribute to the wider body of industry supplier information.  This allows CSR efforts focused on the supply chain to 
become part of new entrants, entrepreneurs, and mom and pop shops. 
FFC members also include industry associations, nonprofits, and universities. And at this scale, the network effect appears to 
be realized.  2,800 of the factories in the FFC system are shared by more than one member and 2,100 documents about these 
factories are shared by FFC members. The FFC collects membership dues to cover its costs and continuously improve the 
software. Company and purchasers pay a percentage fee based on their annual revenues. Supply chain intermediaries are 
charged $500, production suppliers $100, service providers $4,000 and trade associations $10,000 annually.  
MAJOR SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
The FFC’s technology consists of two primary systems: the Audit Management System and the Sharing Platform. 
Audit Management System 
The Audit Management System evolved from Reebok’s original HRTS and was launched in 2006. It goal is to be an efficient 
way to collect and analyze all compliance related information. The system is used to: 
• Manage factory/farm/workplace data, including contacts 
• Deploy self-assessment tools 
• Create customized audit questionnaires 
• Request, schedule, deploy and record audits 
• Manage corrective action plans 
• Manage product information and map supply chain with workplace performance 
• Store audit/assessment documents 
• Analyze workplace/supply chain information 
• Provide access to partners to manage their audit and remedial activities 
• Produce custom reports on almost any data element 
Sharing Platform 
The Sharing Platform was launched two years later in 2008. The sharing platform facilitates sharing data collected by any 
participant for accessibility and transparency among all participants. Some features include: 
• Search factories/farms/workplaces to identify opportunities for collaboration 
• Identify where suppliers overlap with other members 
• Message other members to initiate collaboration 
• Access shared compliance documents 
• Share factory/farm/workplace lists and compliance documents with other members 
 
All sharing done on the FFC’s sharing platform is on a purely voluntary basis. Companies can choose to do it anonymously 
or not. It has even received interest from companies satisfied with own internal database. 
Purchaser Members can purchase both the Audit Management System and Sharing Platform or just the Sharing Platform. 
Supply Chain Intermediaries and Production Supplier Members get both, except they do not have the ability to search or 
access document posted by in the sharing platform by Purchasers. Service Providers get the Audit Management System. 
ADDRESSING ROLLOUT CHALLENGES 
The FFC sought to solve several problems with the auditing process.  With so many different buyers, factories face the 
problem of figuring out how to comply with hundreds and thousands of codes of conduct, all implemented in slightly 
different ways. FFC members can view reports to help them understand the advantages and drawbacks of each and will 
hopefully spark harmonization between them. 
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The unprecedented sharing and collaboration that the FFC provides was a problem that initially threatened the establishment 
of the system. Anytime members of an industry get together to share information on any level, it raises the concern of anti-
trust regulators. Firms in the past have been fined for cartel behavior, collusion, price fixing, and other collaborative, anti-
competitive behavior (Rudolf, 2006). Despite their good intentions, collaborative organizations such as the FFC could run 
into such legal hurdles. Lawyers warned that any major price changes in the industry would appear very suspicious to 
regulators even if it was not caused by the collaboration (Murray, 2006).  Thus before launching its platform the FFC sought 
to clear its operations with the U.S. government. With pro bono help from Greathead and Wiggin & Dana partners Robert M. 
Langer and Suzanne E. Wachsstock, the FFC drafted a letter to the anti-trust division of the Department of Justice outlining 
the organization’s intentions. The FFC was clear that members would only share information on social audits, not 
competitive data. In addition, individual factories will not have access to competitor wage and hour information except in 
aggregate form (Scheffey, 2006). The FFC obtained a favorable business review letter (BRL) from the Department of Justice 
in 2006 stating the government had no intent to challenge its activities. It does not mean the FFC is immune from government 
action, but right now it is unlikely. The Fair Factories Clearinghouse was a go. 
FUTURE CHALLENGES 
The FFC is not unique in its mission. Companies and organizations in other industries have taken a similar approach to 
enforce sustainable and responsible practices. These groups include the Fair Labor Association, Social Accountability 8000, 
Toy Industry Association and Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production. 
While the FFC has done a lot since its inception, there are still many challenges in social audits. Ultimately, efforts like the 
FFC run into a garbage in-garbage out problem. The social audits are only effective if they are accurate and factories continue 
to find ways to cheat audits. Some tactics include keeping two sets of books and giving workers scripted responses for 
common audit questions. There are also reports of a new crop of consulting firms operating overseas, which specialize in 
helping factories evade audits (Roberts, 2006). “We've come to realize that, while monitoring is crucial to measuring the 
performance of our suppliers, it doesn't per se lead to sustainable improvements. We still have the same core problems.” 
Hannah Jones, vice-president for corporate responsibility for Nike told BusinessWeek (Roberts, 2006). 
The next step in improving outsourced working conditions is for companies to partner more closely with suppliers and 
improve business practices. Companies should find structural improvements that benefit the industry. Says World Markets’ 
Scott Greathead, “We [the FFC] intend to someday serve as a sort of Zagat’s guide to overseas manufacturing” (Ravich, 
2009). 
SUMMARY 
The paper highlights how technology has been used to counteract ethical lapses in an industry. Information sharing through 
the Reebok-initiated and now widely adopted Fair Factories Clearinghouse has improved audit practices and recording 
procedures, allowed firms to share information, created beneficial network effects and lowered costs, all while raising the bar 
on industry-wide practice.  The case shows how the effort overcame issues of varying standards, proprietary data, and 
regulatory challenges to craft a genuine example of ‘tech for good’. Future studies will examine the lasting impact of this 
effort (both financial and social), and opportunities to leverage comparable efforts in other industries and contexts to improve 
CSR natives. 
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